We consider Gell-Mann and Hartle's consistent histories formulation of quantum cosmology in the interpretation in which one history, chosen randomly according to the decoherence functional probabilities, is realised from each consistent set. We show that in this interpretation, if one assumes that an observed quasiclassical structure will continue to be quasiclassical, one cannot infer that it will obey the predictions of classical or Copenhagen quantum mechanics.
Introduction
Modern cosmological theory strongly suggests that large-scale classical structure now dominating the universe evolved from a highly homogenous quantum state lacking any such structure. Since this process cannot be described in the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory, other interpretational ideas -requiring, or claiming to require, no pre-existing classical realm -have attracted increasing attention over the last forty years.
There has been particular interest lately in the consistent histories approach to quantum theory developed by Griffiths, [1, 2] Omnès, [3, 4] and Gell-Mann and Hartle. [5, 6] Unlike earlier suggestive but imprecise proposals in the literature, this formulation of the quantum theory of a closed system admits a well-defined interpretation which defines an interesting scientific theory, albeit rather a weak one. The purpose of this paper is to explain precisely how weak this theory is when it comes to predicting the formation and evolution of classical structure.
It was recently shown, [7] inter alia, that one cannot use any version of the consistent histories formalism to predict that the largely classical structure we observe will persist or appear to persist. It is shown here that if we try to evade this difficulty by simply assuming that we will continue to observe a largely classical universe, we cannot use the consistent histories formalism to predict that the classical equations of motion will hold, even approximately, or that the results of quantum experiments will agree with the predictions of the Copenhagen interpretation. The formalism predicts infinitely many different possible outcomes for a typical classical or quantum observation or experiment. The conditional probabilities for these outcomes, given the event that classical structure persists for any fixed time interval, are not defined.
If the aim is to derive a theory of the formation of the observed large-scale structure, or its present dynamics, from a consistent histories formulation of quantum cosmology, these are clearly rather discouraging facts. Their implications are discussed in the concluding section.
Consistent Histories
We simplify the discussion by using a version of the consistent histories formalism in which the initial conditions are defined by a pure state rather than a density matrix, the basic objects of the formalism are branch-dependent sets of projections, and consistency is defined by Gell-Mann and Hartle's decoherence criterion. Similar arguments to those below apply in the general case.
1 The notation is Gell-Mann and Hartle's. [8] Let ψ be the initial state of the universe. A branch-dependent set of histories is a set of products of projection operators chosen from projective decompositions and with a time label. The set is indexed by the variable α = {α n , α n−1 , . . . , α 1 }, where the ranges of the α k and the projections they define depend on the values of α k−1 , . . . , α 1 , and the histories take the form:
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The set of histories is consistent if and only if
in which case p(α) is interpreted as the probability of the history C α . 2 The histories of non-zero probability in a consistent set thus correspond precisely to the non-zero vectors C α ψ. Only consistent sets are of physical relevance. Although the dynamics are defined purely by the hamiltonian, with no collapse postulate, each projection in the history can be thought of as corresponding to a historical event, taking place at the relevant time.
If a given history is realised, its events correspond to extra physical information, neither deducible from the state vector nor influencing it.
Most projection operators involve rather obscure physical quantities, so that it is hard to interpret a general history in familiar language. Given some sensible model, with hamiltonian and canonical variables specified, one can construct sets of histories which describe familiar physics and check that they are indeed consistent. For example, a useful set of histories for describing the solar system could be defined by projection operators whose non-zero eigenspace contains states in which a given planet's centre of mass is located in a suitably chosen small volumes of space at the relevant times, and one would expect a sensible model to show that this is a consistent set and that the histories of significant probability are those agreeing with the trajectories predicted by general relativity. More generally, Gell-Mann and Hartle [5] introduce the notion of a quasiclassical domain: a consistent set which is complete -in the sense that it cannot be consistently extended by more projective decompositions -and is defined by projection operators which involve similar variables at different times and which satisfy classical equations of motion, to a very good approximation, most of the time. By an interpretation of the consistent histories formalism we mean a description of physics which uses only basic mathematical quantities defined in the formalism, such as sets and histories, and which respects the democracy among consistent sets. The literature contains a variety of such interpretations, but essentially these are different ways of saying the same thing. One can, with Griffiths, say that precisely one history from each consistent set is realised, these histories being chosen according to the probability distribution defined on their set. One can, more economically, say that in fact only one consistent set is physically relevant, but that we have no theoretical rule which identifies this set or its properties. [7] Or one can, as Gell-Mann and Hartle do, say that the predictions one makes depend on the set one uses -though here it must be understood that for almost all sets these predictions will not correspond to the physics one actually observes. In each case, though, it is to be understood that we can only observe events from one history, and that the formalism supplies no theoretical criterion characterising the consistent set from which that history is drawn. These forms of words are scientifically equivalent. When we come to predicting the future from historical data, our predictions all take the form "if S turns out to be the relevant consistent set, then event E will take place with probability p". No event can be predicted independent of the as yet unknown set S, and in fact any prediction made in a generic consistent set S will be incompatible with the predictions made in some other consistent set S ′ . 3 We will use the many-histories language here. Nature consists of a list of histories H(S) drawn from each consistent set S. No observer can observe events from more than one such history. The formalism predicts neither the history H(S) in which we find ourselves nor the set S to which it belongs. It supplies only the probabilities for the possible H(S) given the unknown set S.
I should like to add here the cautionary remark that there is another interpretation of the consistent histories formalism which is not equivalent to the many-histories interpretation considered here. 4 This interpretation, which as I understand it is not advocated by Griffiths, Omnès, or Gell-Mann & Hartle (but see Saunders [11] ), can be summarised by saying that every consistent history is realised in a continuum of copies whose measure is given by the history's probability weight. 
Quasiclassical Histories in Quantum Cosmology
In the absence of a quantum theory of gravity, we work in some fixed background spacetime with preferred timelike directions and suppose that the gravitational interactions of matter can be modelled by a non-covariant quantum potential. This is obviously incorrect, but at least shares qualitative features with the type of description that it is hoped might emerge from a fundamental theory.
A semi-classical treatment, in which the background manifold depends on the largescale structures in the matter distribution described by the different branches, would presumably give a better description of our quasiclassical domain. But it is hard to see any useful role for a consistency criterion in a semi-classical theory, and in any case no adequate semi-classical theory is available. Gell-Mann and Hartle's definition of a quasiclassical domain has to be understood as a definition which applies to real world cosmology only in the context of a theory of gravity yet to be developed.
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What can be said about cosmology in our model? No consistent set can give the correct account of the evolution of large-scale structure, since there is no definitive account of the unobserved past in the consistent histories formalism. However, cosmologically minded consistent historians envisage that the set defining our quasiclassical domain can be extended to a set -there may well be many such sets, but let us fix on one and call it S 0 -which gives a particularly interesting account, running very roughly as follows.
Some projective decomposition P 1 α 1 at an early time t 1 characterises inhomogeneities which mark the beginning of the formation of structure. Further decompositions
, which depend on the inhomogeneities already realised, describe the development of greater and finer-grained inhomogeneity. By some later time, say t k+1 , almost all of the projections in these decompositions become, to a very good approximation, 5 Though the separate discussion necessary for this interpretation is beyond the scope of this paper, it seems to me that the interpretation suffers from related and equally severe problems. 6 A discussion of possible generalisations of the formalism to quantum gravity can be found in
Ref. [12] .
projections onto ranges of eigenvalues for hydrodynamic variables. At this point the histories of non-zero probability define many distinct branches of the quasiclassical domain, each of which corresponds to the formation of significantly different large-scale structures.
This branching process continues through to the present, through processes such as the quantum spreading of macroscopic bodies and those of their interactions with microscopic particles or subsystems that are subsequently macroscopically amplified. Each probabilistic quantum experiment that we perform, for example, defines a new branching. There are thus, by now, a very large number of non-zero history vectors C α ψ corresponding to distinct quasiclassical branches. The quasiclassical domain is filled out, between all these branchings, by many projective decompositions describing events which are very nearly predictable from the earlier history.
The branching process must stop at some point if the Hilbert space is finitedimensional, since all the non-zero history vectors are orthogonal and any new branching adds to their number. [7, 9] The familiar description of quantum experiments cannot be reproduced beyond this point, since all subsequent events are predictable. Indeed, it is not clear that the quasiclassical domain can continue at all. Consistent historians thus generally tacitly assume that the Hilbert space is infinite-dimensional, or at least that the present number of branches is very much smaller than its dimension. In order to simplify the discussion we will do so too.
Although Gell-Mann and Hartle generally refer to quasiclassicality as a property of domains, it is obviously sensible and useful to refer to individual histories as being quasiclassical if they are built from projectors defined by hydrodynamic variables and if the conditional probabilities of most of these projectors, given the earlier history, is very close to one. The picture S 0 gives, then, is of a large number of histories C α , including our own history C α 0 , defined up to the present time t 0 , almost all of which are quasiclassical in their later stages. Any quantum experiments we now undertake can be described by a consistent set S ′ 0 which extends S 0 by projections, defined for the branch of S 0 corresponding to our own history, which (very nearly) describe future hydrodynamic variables -the local densities around the possible paths of a pointer, say -that record the results.
The possible outcomes of these experiments are described by a series of non-zero history vectors P β 1 C α 0 ψ, . . . , P β k C α 0 ψ . Each of these outcomes corresponds to a quasiclassical history, which we take to be complete up to time t > t 0 . Let us suppose we are just about to undertake such an experiment, and for simplicity suppose that the number of outcomes, k, is three or larger. Now consider a similar branching, corresponding to another quantum process with several macroscopically distinct outcomes, described by vectors P γ 1 C α ψ, . . . , P γ l C α ψ in a history C α ψ other than our own. These histories can be described in the equivalent consistent set in which the projective decomposition defined by the P γ i is replaced by that defined by the one-dimensional projectors P
By making similar substitutions of the projective decompositions on all branches other than our own, we can construct an infinite number of consistent sets S whose only quasiclassical history is our own, C α 0 . After the branching defined, in any of these sets, by the experiment we are about to undertake, the only quasiclassical histories will be the P β i C α 0 , corresponding to the k possible experimental results. Finally, we can pick one result, i 0 , and again define new consistent sets by replacing the projectors P β i for i = i 0 by projectors onto another orthonormal basis of the subspace spanned by {P β i C α 0 : i = i 0 }. In this way we can construct an infinite number of consistent sets S which include precisely one of the histories P β i 0 C α 0 , which extend the history C α 0 non-quasiclassically between times t 0 and t in all the other (k − 1) branches, and which have no other quasiclassical histories. These sets do not correspond to quasiclassical domains, but contain one quasiclassical branch, which describes our history to date together with one of the possible outcomes of the experiments we are about to undertake. The probabilities of the histories P β i C α 0 are non-zero. Now, according to the manyhistories interpretation, one history is realised from each of the sets S , and the probability of being realised from any given set is simply the standard history probability. Since we have seen that there are an infinite number of consistent sets containing any of these histories, it follows with probability one that each of these k histories is realised infinitely many 7 Though sets of histories of this type do not seem to have been explicitly considered in the literature, most consistent historians would, I believe, take their existence for granted in any sensible cosmological model. times from sets S of the form described above. That is, each of the quasiclassical histories defined by all of our observed data to date, together with one of the possible experimental results, is realised infinitely many times. The consistent histories formalism, in the manyhistories interpretation, realises an infinite number of copies of each possible quasiclassical outcome, and these copies of course include descriptions of ourselves observing our history and the outcome of the experiment. This is the problem. The formalism supplies us neither with any way of identifying the correct set from which to draw our history, nor with any probability measure on the sets. Thus, though we can identify the history describing the data we observe, and though, when given a particular consistent set, we can calculate the probabilities of its histories, we have no way to compute theoretically, or from empirical data, the probability of belonging to a history realised from any given set or class of sets. If we merely adopt the assumption that our realised history up to time t will be quasiclassical, we can make no probabilistic predictions. In order to do so, we need to make a stronger assumption -for example, that our history will be one realised from a particular set. To make such an assumption is to go beyond the formalism.
The discussion applies a fortiori to the predictions of classical mechanics since, of course, these predictions are never made with complete certainty. The argument just outlined holds so long as the probabilities are non-zero, and there is always some tiny probability that the position of a macroscopic object will undergo a significant quantum fluctuation without violating the quasiclassicality of its history. While the classical equations of motion are supposed to hold to a very good approximation, nearly all of the time, in a quasiclassical domain, a macroscopic tunnelling event need not violate these criteria.
For example, if we study a ball thrown against a wall, a very nearly consistent 8 set can be defined by projection operators whose eigenspaces correspond to states in which the ball's centre of mass lies within small volumes of space on either side of the wall, and the history in which the ball's centre of mass trajectory goes towards the wall and then continues on the far side is a quasiclassical history whose probability, though tiny, is non-zero.
It might possibly be argued against this last point that it is sensible to ignore very small probability histories in the formalism. There are several problems with this line of Gell-Mann and Hartle require only approximately consistent sets. [5] However, it is conjectured [7] that this set can be approximated by an exactly consistent set which describes essentially the same physics. The conjecture is investigated further in Ref. [13] .
defence, however. It is true that, as Gell-Mann and Hartle point out, [5] it is often sensible and convenient to ignore small probability histories. If, for example, we have found a good theoretical reason to fix a particular set of histories for making predictions, and find that within that set the probability of the sun failing to rise tomorrow is 10
−10
40 , we can for all practical purposes take it to be zero. But this does not imply (and Gell-Mann and
Hartle do not argue) that small probability histories are meaningless or always theoretically negligible. In particular, small probability histories can still give rise to large conditional probabilities. The construction above produces infinitely many consistent sets in which the only quasiclassical history is one in which the sun fails to rise and of course, in those sets, the probability of no sunrise conditioned on persisting quasiclassicality is, tautologically, one.
It is true that we could simply declare by fiat that all histories with probability smaller than some parameter ǫ are to be neglected. Some care would be required here, since the probability of our own realised history, ǫ 0 , is by now extremely small, and ǫ/ǫ 0 would also have to be very small if we are to continue observing random events for very long. But in any case this strategy would mean that ǫ/ǫ 0 becomes a key parameter in determining the outcome of experiments. No outcome i whose probability conditioned on the past history, p(i|H), is smaller than ǫ/ǫ 0 could arise. However, we would still have no way of deriving from the many-histories interpretation the correct probabilities, conditioned on future quasiclassicality, for outcomes for which p(i|H) > ǫ/ǫ 0 . Many predictions of classical mechanics might, for some finite time interval, be recovered by this strategy -at the price of introducing a new experimentally determinable parameter -but the predictions of Copenhagen quantum mechanics cannot be.
Finally, it should be stressed that the problem identified here is quite different from the generally recognised problems of precisely defining quasiclassicality [5] and of understanding the error limits within which classical physics can be recovered once a set involving classical variables has been specified. [3, 4] The arguments here require only a heuristic definition of quasiclassicality, [5] but of course would remain valid if a precise definition were supplied.
Conclusions
The argument we have given is very simple. Predictions within the formalism depend on one's choice of set. If we choose one of the infinitely many sets whose only quasiclassical history describes a series of N measurements of σ x on spin-1 particles prepared in the eigenstate σ y = 1 , in each of which σ x = 1 is observed, then our prediction is that either quasiclassicality will fail to persist or that σ x = 1 will repeatedly be observed. If we condition on the persistence of quasiclassicality, then in this set the latter prediction is made with probability one. And indeed, this sequence of results is realised in an infinite number of sets, as are all other sequences. Without a measure on the space of sets, we cannot assign any a priori probability distribution to the choice of set which should be used for prediction, and hence -if we assume the persistence of quasiclassicality -cannot assign any probabilities to our quasiclassical predictions.
Is the conclusion interesting? Why should anyone have hoped to calculate conditional probabilities of the type considered? Might the conclusion perhaps rely on a perverse reading of the consistent histories formalism? Can we not easily find another interpretation in which no similar difficulty arises? Is there perhaps a natural measure on the consistent sets which produces the correct probabilistic predictions? If not, is there a simple amendment to the formalism which does the job? We take these points in turn.
At issue here is the relation between the consistent histories formulation of quantum cosmology, classical mechanics and Copenhagen quantum mechanics. Nothing that the consistent histories formalism says is inconsistent with either of these last two theories. It does not contradict their predictions. However, it does not allow us to derive them. Given any quasiclassical history, such as the one we find ourselves in, the formalism makes no probabilistic or deterministic predictions of future events. As we have seen, this still holds true if we assume that the history will continue to be quasiclassical. The predictions of Copenhagen quantum mechanics do not follow even from the consistent histories account of quantum cosmology combined with the assumption of a quasiclassical history obeying standard classical mechanics to a good approximation. All three theories are independent.
Gell-Mann and Hartle argue [5] that, although all consistent sets are equivalent in the formalism, we find ourselves perceiving a quasiclassical history because we have evolved so as to become sensitive to quasiclassical variables and adapted to make use of them. There are implicit assumptions in this argument which need not concern us here. [7] Let us accept that it might be so, and suppose that some theory of perception tells us that for the purpose of predicting our own future perceptions we can ignore the possibility that we might find ourselves in a non-quasiclassical history. The preceding discussion still tells us that there are infinitely many observers sharing our evolutionary history, continuing to observe a quasiclassical world in the future, who find their subsequent observations disagreeing with classical mechanics and Copenhagen quantum mechanics. This in itself need not be an insuperable problem; however, the formalism does not define any probability measure that allows us to tell which type of realised quasiclassical history is more probable. Thus, accepting Gell-Mann and Hartle's argument, we find ourselves unable to use the consistent histories formalism to make the predictions of classical mechanics and Copenhagen quantum mechanics.
We need not interpret the formalism in many-histories language. The other interpretations of the formalism in the literature, though, have the same implication when it comes to making predictions, and it is easy to see why without rehearsing the full argument [7] for their equivalence. To predict anything, in any interpretation, we require data, in the form of the observed history H , and a consistent set S which includes the projections defining that history. Neither the inclusion of the projections defining H , nor the assumption that S contains quasiclassical histories extending H , are very strong constraints on S . Without assuming some sort of probability measure on the space of sets we cannot characterise the likely properties of S . In particular we cannot say what type of histories it is likely to contain, or which quasiclassical histories it is likely to contain.
There is, indeed, a natural measure on the consistent sets of histories, defined at least if the Hilbert space is finite-dimensional, and inherited from the geometric description of consistent sets as algebraic curves. [7] Unfortunately, though unsurprisingly, when restricted to the class of sets containing extensions of a given quasiclassical history, it assigns measure zero to the subclass containing quasiclassical extensions of that history. In other words, if the formalism is amended so that the physically relevant set is chosen according to the natural measure, it predicts with probability one that the quasiclassicality we observe will cease immediately.
The obvious amendment to the formalism is to abandon democracy amongst consistent sets. If we hypothesise that a set defining our quasiclassical domain is the physically relevant set, or more generally that among the physically relevant sets it is the only one including some the projections which characterise the observed data, then we can certainly predict the persistence of quasiclassicality and derive the predictions of classical and Copenhagen quantum mechanics. 9 In practice this is almost precisely what we do when we make experimentally testable predictions: we do not typically use all the projections defining our quasiclassical domain, but the variables we do consider are always quasiclassical projections or operators almost perfectly correlated with those projections. To suppose 9 Another possible strategy, though one fraught with problems, is the selection of sets which characterise observers rather than domains. [7] that a particular set or type of set is fundamentally preferred, of course, is to go beyond orthodox quantum theory, by insisting that particular variables are distinguished. However, it appears to be necessary in order to derive our most successful physical theories from the consistent histories formulation of quantum cosmology.
There are at least two genuine, and genuinely new, interpretations of quantum theory which follow the line of thought that begins with the arguments of Everett et al. [14] that quantum theory admits a "many-worlds interpretation". One of these, due to Bell, [15, 16] abandons the notion of a coherent historical description of physics entirely: the events occurring at any time are uncorrelated with those at earlier or later times. This proposal is logically consistent and, given the correct dynamics and boundary conditions, experimentally unfalsifiable, but is not thought by most physicists (and was not thought by Bell) to be a useful scientific theory, since it makes cosmology redundant, memory fictitious, and useful prediction impossible. The other is the interpretation based on the consistent histories formalism considered here. Neither allows the derivation of a theory of quasiclassical physics.
This is not to say that either the formalism itself or the current ideas about structure formation are misguided. The former suggests at least one possible way of going beyond orthodox quantum theory. The latter implicitly rely on intuitions, which may well be sound, about the variables which might be distinguished. It would seem, though, that if we want a genuine derivation of a theory of the formation and dynamics of the quasiclassical structure in the universe from quantum cosmology, in which we can make the usual quasiclassical predictions, then we have to go beyond orthodox quantum theory as it is presently understood by identifying preferred variables in some way. This need not necessarily involve any change in the dynamics.
